Russian Propaganda. Debunk.org Report on Moscow's Disinformation Scale

According to last year’s report from Debunk.org, spending on pro-Kremlin media agencies in Q1 2022 was three times higher compared to the same period in 2021. In June 2022, Russian authorities stopped disclosing detailed state budget information. However, data from the Russian think tank Economic Expert Group indicates that the 115 billion RUB budget allocated for mass media last year was significantly exceeded. By November 2022, the funds were nearly depleted, and Debunk.org estimates that the Kremlin may have spent a total of 143 billion RUB on state media.

source: Debunk.org

In 2023, as in previous years, over half of the allocated mass media budget was directed to three key propaganda agencies.

- 51% of the funds went to the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), RT (formerly Russia Today), and Rossiya Segodnya, notes co-author of the analysis, Aleksandra Michałowska-Kubś.

source: Debunk.org

VGTRK, a media holding targeting primarily Russian audiences, is set to receive 25.8 billion RUB this year. It operates a network of federal and regional television channels, with programs also available online. However, television popularity in Russia has recently declined—between February and July 2022, the audience for Channel One, Russia-1, and NTV dropped by a quarter. Furthermore, since the war in Ukraine began, VGTRK lost several key foreign sponsors as companies advertising on its channels exited the Russian market. The agency has also been impacted by Western sanctions.


- It seems, however, that 25.8 billion RUB is sufficient to broadcast propaganda domestically and expand media operations in the occupied territories of Ukraine. It was announced that VGTRK is opening branches in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, notes Michałowska-Kubś.

Meanwhile, RT, the main pillar of the Kremlin’s international information influence, has seen a slight funding decrease. In 2023, it was allocated 26.3 billion RUB. Sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine have led the agency to cease broadcasting in the EU, Canada, the US, and the UK and to close selected offices. However, RT has found ways to expand its operations, including entering the Serbian market. RT Balkan plans to start broadcasting no later than 2024. The agency is also strengthening its presence in Asia, Africa, and South America.

Interestingly, another entity funded by the budget has received significant generosity from Russian authorities. In 2023, Zvezda, a media network run by the Russian Ministry of Defense, nearly doubled its funding to 3.5 billion RUB.

source: Debunk.org

- This year`s analysis confirms that propaganda is a key pillar of the regime and one of the Kremlin`s main tools of power. Legal changes threatening up to 15 years in prison for spreading "false information" about the so-called "special military operation" and the elimination of remaining independent media further emphasize that Russian authorities treat information as a weapon—not only against their own citizens. It’s important to remember that for Russia, the information space has always been a battleground, conclude analysts from the think tank Debunk.org.

advertisement
Debunk.org is an independent tech-focused think tank and NGO specializing in analyzing disinformation and running educational media campaigns across eight countries. It has been countering disinformation since 2017. Link to the full article: https://www.debunk.org/pl/w-zeszłym-roku-propaganda-kosztowała-kreml-1-9-mld-usd-budżet-na-media-został-przekroczony-o-25

SWAMPED and ZASŁONA: Russian Disinformation Techniques

The EU’s East StratCom Task Force, dedicated to identifying disinformation originating outside the EU, published a list on the EUvsDisinfo portal outlining the methods the Kremlin and its agencies use to spread disinformation globally, including in Poland.

The set of disinformation and propaganda techniques is summarized under the acronym SWAMPED:

• S for Straw Man:
  Attributing statements or opinions to a person or institution that were never expressed, then mocking, undermining, or attacking those views.
• W for Whataboutism:
  Creating the illusion of hypocrisy on the opposing side by deflecting accusations with arguments that "you/they did or do something similar."
• A for Attack:
  Spreading information, often false, aimed at discrediting or compromising the opponent.
• M for Mockery:
  Ridiculing or mocking the other side, often using out-of-context, exaggerated, or manipulated information.
• P for Provocations:
  Undermining opinions and beliefs using false but widely distributed claims to sow doubt and distrust.
• E for Exhaust:
  Distracting from the core issue by overwhelming the opponent with both authentic and fabricated data, statistics, and comparisons.
• D for Denial:
  A defensive method involving denial of evidence, disclaiming responsibility, and suggesting accusations stem from bias or prejudice.

A common trait of these techniques is that they exclude any possibility of dialogue. More on manipulation and disinformation techniques can be read at https://euvsdisinfo.eu/pl/zaslona-dezinformacji-czesc-1-zaprzeczenie/